

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS PO Box 1450 Alcassedan, Virginia 22313-1450 www.emplo.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/554,079	10/21/2005	Martin Kurth	16-885 P/US	4484	
26294 TAROLLI SI	7590 08/21/200 JNDHEIM, COVELL &	EXA	EXAMINER		
1300 EAST NINTH STREET, SUITE 1700			MACARTHUR, VICTOR L		
CLEVEVLAND, OH 44114			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
			3679	•	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
			08/21/2009	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/554,079	KURTH ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
VICTOR MACARTHUR	3679	

	VICTOR MACARTHUR	3679	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 11 August 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS AF	PPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	ALLOWANCE.	
 M The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must limely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appendor for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods: 	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailling date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire te Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f)	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	date of the final rejection	n.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1,136(a). The date have been filled is the date for purposes of determining the period of ext under 37 CFR 1,17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the s set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patient term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1,704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origi than three months after the mailing dat	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS.	sion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, by	out prior to the date of filing a brief	will not be entered be	001100
(a) They raise new issues that would require further cor (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belote) (c) They are not deemed to place the application in better.	nsideration and/or search (see NO) w);	TE below);	
appeal; and/or (d) They present additional claims without canceling a c			10 133003 101
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	orresponding number or finally reje	octod ciairris.	
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12		mpliant Amendment (l	PTOL-324).
 Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all 		imal: filed emendmen	et according the
non-allowable claim(s).	owable ii submitted iii a separate, i	intely filed afficilities	it canceling the
7. \(\) For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [\) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:		I be entered and an e	xplanation of
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary 	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appear and was not earlier presented. Se	al and/or appellant fail ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1	s to provide a
 The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 	n of the status of the claims after er	ntry is below or attach	ed.
 The request for reconsideration has been considered but <u>See Continuation Sheet.</u> 	t does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:
12. Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (13. Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s).		
	/Victor MacArthur/ Primary Examiner, Art U	nit 3679	

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant's arguments are not persuasive.

The applicant generally argues that the functional limitations are not inherent to the prior art structure since the prior art is silent on the subject of such function. The applicant sites the doctrine of inherency stating that "if an element is not expressly disclosed in a prior art reference, the reference will still be deemed to include the missing element it the missing element is 'necessarily present' in the item described in the reference"

The examiner reminds applicant that functional limitations are NOT "elements". If the applicant is having trouble identifying the difference between a functional limitation and a structural element he is invited to call the examiner for help. The examiner strongly suggests reading and understanding sections 2112.01 and 2114 of the MPEP prior to setting up an interview or filling further response. These sections make it very clear that Product claims are defined by their structure and that functional limitations only limit a product claim in as much as it requires specific structure. As detailed in the previous Office Action, all of applicant's claimed structural "elements" are suggested by the prior art. If applicant wishes to gain patentability based solely on a functional limitation the applicant must obtain and test the prior art and then submit evidence proving that the prior art structure is not inherently capable of performing the claimed functions. Also note the following:

MPEP \$2112.01 (1) states "When the structure recited in the reference is <u>substantially</u> identical to that of the <u>claims</u>, claimed properties or functions are presumed to be inherent... [and] a <u>prima facte</u> case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established" (emphasis added);

MPEP §2114 states "Apparatus claims must be structurally distinguishable from the prior art... [and the] Manner of operating the device does not differentiate apparatus claim from the prior art... [and] A claim containing a 'recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from the prior art apparatus' if the prior art apparatus teaches all the <u>structural</u> limitations of the claim. Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987)" (emphasis in original).

"Where, as here, the <u>claimed</u> and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product. See In re Ludke, supra. Whether the rejection is based on 'Inherency' under 35 USC 102, on 'prima facie obviousness' under 35 USC 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same, and its fairness is evidenced by the PTO's inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products. See In re Brown, 59 CCPA 1036, 459 F.2d 531, 173 USPQ 685 (1972)" (emphasis added) In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433-34 (CCPA 1977);

"Apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function." *In re Schreiber*, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431-32 (Fed.Cir.1997)

"Apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does." See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Long Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990)

"[I] is elementary that the mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property, inherently possessed by things in the prior art, does not cause a claim drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior art. Additionally, where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter <u>mav</u>, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on." (emphasis added) *In re Swinehart*, 58 CCPA -, -F.2d -, 169 USPQ 226 (1971), and *In re Ludtke*, 441 F.2d 660, 664, 169 USPQ 563, 566 (CCPA 1971):

"[I]t is the patentability of the product claimed and not of the recited process steps which must be established. We are therefore of the opinion that when the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section 102 or section 103 of the statute is eminently fair and acceptable. As a practical matter, the Patent Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make physical comparisons therewith." (emphasis added) In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972);

"Contrary to appellant's reasoning, after the PTO establishes a *prima facie* case of anticipation based on inherency, the burden shifts to appellant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not posses the characteristic relied on... Here, appellant's burden before the board was to prove that Donley's structure does not perform the so-called method defined in the claims when placed in ambient light. Appellant did not satisfy that burden, it did not suffice merely to assert that Donley does not inherently achieve enhanced color through interference effects, challenging the PTO to prove the contrary by experiment or otherwise. The PTO is not equipped to perform such tasks." *In re King*, 80 I F.2d 1324, 1327, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986):

"Spada was reasonably required to show that his polymer compositions are different from those described by Smith. This burden was not met by simply including the assertedly different properties in the claims. When the claimed compositions are not novel they are not rendered patentable by recitation of properties, whether or not these properties are shown or suggested in the prior art." *In re Spada*, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990):